Confident in the lore of my predecessors at the Ministry of Health I have accepted (Bradley 1947) certain principles as valid under the conditions we can expect to meet in this country, where smallpox is no longer endemic and, if there is proper vigilance, we can hope to catch up with importation of variola major, although we might be in greater difficulty with variola minor. These principles are:
(a) The patient is not infectious until after the onset of illness. Recent studies by Downie et al. (1961) in Madras provide some laboratory confirmation of this. (b) The patient ceases to be a menace when removed to a secure smallpox hospital. (c) Careful identification and listing of persons who have been in physical cpntact with the patient, their immediate vaccination by at least two insertions with daily inspection thereof and their surveillance by Medical Officers of Health for sixteen days, without any sanctions to restrict their freedom while they remain well, provide the, essential measures for controlling the spread of variola virus. (d) Should secondary cases occur, the powers in Public Health Act, 1936, are adequate for the protection of the public. Spread can occur from extra-human sources, e.g. contaminated laundry. Such risks must be expected but, if cases do arise from such sources, they merely set one back a pace or two and they should not shake confidence in the principles stated.
Summary ofEvents
In the first five months of 1962 there were 62 cases and 24 deaths from smallpox following 5 importations from Pakistan. Except for the special circumstances around smallpox hospitals, which I shall emphasize later, three cases only occurred in people not under surveillance.
Forty-six of the total of 62 cases in England and Wales occurred in Wales; Dr Culley will describe these. The next largest episode was at Bradford with 14 indigenous cases of whom 6 died. This incident was described by Dr W Edgar, Deputy Medical Officer of Health of Bradford, at a symposium arranged by the Royal Society of Health on July 25, 1962; Dr Benn will discuss the clinical aspects of the cases there.
Some people have suggested that the type of disease in Karachi was particularly virulent and that, for this reason, it overcame immunity. I cannot support the idea that these episodes were due to anything other than the ordinary run of variola major virus from the Indian subcontinent. I mention this in connexion with my comment regarding the importations.
The Five Importations Within twenty-six days, from December 17, 1961 , to January 11, 1962 immigrants from Pakistan entered England by way of London Airport and subsequently developed smallpox. All carried valid international certificates of vaccination. When considered as a group, these 5 importations were a unique episode. Nothing similar has been reported in this country since four infected ships from Bombay entered the Mersey in 1946 nor, so far as I know, recently from any other part of the world. It seems to be a reasonable conclusion that ecologically something extraordinary was happening in Karachi within the ambit of the movement, not of all Pakistanis then coming to the United Kingdom in large numbers, but of relatively few. In order of ascertainment the importations were:
Case 1 (St Pancras Met. B.) This man vomited on the tarmac at the airport in Paris on the evening of Christmas Day, 1961. From that evening until late on December 27, he spent his nights in one tenement in St Pancras and his days in another lodging rented by his married brother. He was progressively unwell and was nursed by his sister-in-law. Towards midnight on December 27 these three took a taxi to University College Hospital where a diagnosis of smallpox was made. At 10.30 a.m. on December 28, the patient was moved to the smallpox hospital at Long Reach, already very ill with confluent smallpox, and there he died on January 6, 1962. Bhandari & Tracy (1962) have described the action taken. The difficulties of keeping under control the transient Pakistani and Chinese contacts were mitigated by a most co-operative landlady. The sister-in-law, who was most at risk, was revaccinated on December 28, the third day of contact, and had a strong accelerated reaction. On January 12, she developed a temperature and one or two very atypical lesions on the hand; she was removed to Long Reach Hospital. She was not formally notified as suffering from smallpox. There were no further cases in Central London. Cases at Woolwich Met. B. and Hornchurch U.D. on the eastern fringe of London are mentioned below.
Case 2 (West Bromwich C.B.) This patient had arrived on December 19, 1961, and travelled by taxi from London Airport to West Bromwich where he intended to live. He was unwell on December 21 but did not attend the doctor until December 28, when he visited a surgery in Tipton, where suspicion of smallpox arose and he was admitted to Witton Hospital.
The only secondary case that came to light was in the Medical Officer of Health who had examined him. A wide and vigorous search was made for contacts. Their vaccination and surveillance were carried out in all the Local Authorities concened. No further cases were detected.
Case 3 (Bradford C.B.)
This 9-year-old girl arrived at London Airport with her mother and father on December 16, 1961, and went to their home in Bradford. She spent Christmas Day in Bradford Children's Hospital under treatment for malaria. Benign tertian parasites were found in the blood. She became apyrexial on December 26, but remained ill and on December 29, she had a terminal rise in temperature followed by a petechial rash and death within twenty-four hours. A post-mortem was performed and the body embalmed and returned to Pakistan.
Dr Edgar gave the following description:
'Such was the innocent and unsuspected introduction of smallpox into the City . . . On the afternoon of 11 January, the pathologist at St Luke's Hospital examined a blood film from a patient employed in the abattoir, who had been admitted the previous day with thrombocytopenic purpura, and died that morning in D2 ward in the hospital. He was immediately struck by the unusual blood picture and by its close similarity to the blood film of the patient in Leeds Road Fever Hospital which he had examined earlier in the day. Knowing the latter was a suspected case of smallpox, he immediately appreciated the possibility of this second patient having died from the disease and informed the Medical Officer of Health. Great credit must be paid to the pathologist for his skill and action.'
It was then appreciated that 4 children with spots under observation at Bradford Children's Hospital, and a fifth child, originally in the same ward and subsequently transferred to Wharfedale Children's Hospital, who had developed spots, were likely to be cases of smallpox. Another suspect was a nurse on the staff of the Children's Hospital. Enquiries revealed the dead Pakistani child as the probable source of the outbreak. It seemed clear that the pathologist who had performed the post-mortem was at considerable risk; he received primary vaccination ten days after exposure but he became ill the next day and died.
'Within a period of 72 hours, therefore, 11 suspected cases of smallpox had come to light and the four main hospitals in the city had been placed in quarantine. Added to this, the publicity associated with the steps taken to control the outbreak, whilst reassuring to the public, served to underline the seriousness of the situation.' There were in fact 9 proved cases in the first generation at Bradford and 3 in the second, which terminated the outbreak there.
Case 4 (Birmingham C.B.) This was an adult male who arrived in Birmingham via London Airport on January 4, 1962. He was taken irl on January 8 but did not notice a rash until January 14. He was admitted to smallpox hospital on January 15. No secondary cases developed.
Case 5 (Cardiff C.B.) This man travelled from London Airport to Birmingham by taxi on January 12,1962, proceeding to Cardiff by train the next day. He was taken ill at the end of this journey but did not call upon a doctor until two days later. In Cardiff no secondary cases occurred amongst the many persons known to have been in contact with him.
The unexpected events which followed the removal of Case 5 to the smallpox hospital in the Rhondda will be described by Dr Culley but, with his permission, I have included the Welsh cases in Table 1 , which shows the vaccinal states of 60 cases in Bradford, Rhondda, Llantrisant and Bridgend (Hansard 1962) .
Some of the problems which emerged during the outbreak became major issues which are now under consideration, such as vaccination policy, by the Central Health Services Council, and inter-Section ofEpidemiology andPreventive Medicine 337 
The Importations
Personally, I assume that importations of smallpox will remain inevitable until the World Health Organization's prograe to eliminate the disease from the world has succeeded. For the record I must mention that there were other importations later in 1962 by three members of one family who embarked on s.s. Oronsay at Bombay on July 30.
Although the measures to prevent importations might be improved by international regulations, the five importations at the beginning of 1962 suggest to me that studies of the circumstances of infection would still be profitable. The five importations were on five aircraft in twenty-six days; the conjectured dates of infection were December 14, 16, 27 and January 2. They were four young adult Pakistani males and one 9-year-old Pakistani girl travelling with her parents. All had valid vaccination certificates. It seems they must all have been infected on the Indian continent and probably in Karachi. We could not have known that Pakistani iigrants carried an unusual risk The Public Alarm Since the National Health Service Act, 1946, radio, television and the press have become a universal influence dominating popular reactions. Disease is now a public spectacle with entertainment value. The entertainers cannot wait for authentic copy but must snatch what they can get while it is still hotnews. However, the best journalists appreciate the dilemma (Haley 1962) and can be trusted.
Although the experienced Medical Officer of Health acquires great skill in handling public relations situations, my impression is that nowadays he finds it more and more difficult to keep abreast of the news and almost impossible to be one step ahead. My own office is frequently blamed for its reticence but many will-realize that we have tried not to speak publicly until Medical Officers of Health have become informed and have communicated to other doctors.
The St Pancras case, who vomited on the tarmac at the airport in Paris on Christmas night, may have been infective on the joumey and there was little information about his contacts during transit. When he was recognized as a case of smallpox on December 29 there was still time to save the lives of infected contacts; therefore all forms of public announcement had to be used on a national and international scale.
The other four importations raised no such problems and could have been managed discreetly, public announcements and all, at Local Authority level had the Ministry of Health not been forced by circumstances to raise a general alarm in the first instance. One of the prices paid was difficulty over the distribution of lymph supplies, although the reserve was adequate to meet the emergency.
I repeat that four of the importations could have been managed entirely at Local Authority level: the patients were already fixed in a house or 3 338 Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine 4 hospital before they became infectious. Commenting on the Bradford episode, Elliott, County Medical Officer for the West Riding, wrote:
'The Yorkshire outbreak of smallpox was almost unique in this country in that it gave rise to a tremendous demand for vaccination not only locally but far afield. The demand was, for example, much heavier and widespread than in the Todmorden outbreak. This partly arose out of undesirable publicity but, in the main, was a resulthowever illogicalof the association of this outbreak with colour prejudice. Emotion was far more in evidence than reason and even within the medical profession there were understandable signs of tension. The resultant demand for vaccine lymph was unprecedented. Within a few days the Public Health Laboratories found it necessary to ration very strictly the distribution of lymph.' (Elliott & Lyons 1962) Dixon (1962) uses words which fit this situation: 'In preventive medicine, as in surgery, it is unfortunate that conservative skill receives less acclamation from a public ignorant of the true facts than does the major operation.'
Since the National Health Service Act there has been a change in emphasis regarding the responsibility of local government in the control and prevention of infectious diseases. There should never be any doubt that the Sanitary District Authority has the powers and responsibility to control smallpox.
At least during the first three or four generations of smallpox the Medical Officer of Health can choose the area of his operations against the disease. If statements regarding these operations or the incidence of the disease are always related to Sanitary Districts, or areas of known population within them, the impression will not be given, at home or abroad, that large tracts of the country are infected and dangerous. Smallpox in the Vicinity ofSmallpox Hospitals On three occasions, the interval of twice the incubation period being almost expired, the information was being prepared which would cause World Health Organization to declare us free from smallpox when unexplained cases without evidence of contact were recognized. Four districts were involved: Woolwich Met. B. on January 24, Hornchurch U.D. on January 30, Rhondda M.B. on February 25 and Penybont R.D. on April 7. In the whole series of 62 cases, all but these four could be attributed to fairly obvious sources although, naturally, there were doubts about a few. In three of the four entirely unexplained cases, there was no evidence of contact or any information about possible sources of infection under surveillance within 150 miles. Regarding the Penybont incident there were, at a material time, in Llantrisant R.D. a few miles away, three cases of smallpox not under surveillance but no contact either direct or indirect with the Glanrhyd Mental Hospital, Bridgend, has been established.
But within 10,000, 4,000, 3,000 and 4,000 feet of the four unexplained cases respectively, as the crow flies, there was at a material time a possible source of infection in a smallpox hospital nearby. The hospitals were Long Reach, Penrhys and Heddfan.
These circumstances raise once more the question of 'spread of smallpox occasioned by smallpox hospitals' which was discussed so vigorously and inconclusively by the Epidemiological Society of London at the beginning of the century (Buchanan 1905) . Nowadays, scientific studies, for example, on airborne micro-organisms (Harper 1961 ) are likely to be more profitable than opinion and argument and it seems unjust to guess where the breaches in security lie when there are other possibilities which have yet to be disproved.
Conclusion
Six months after these events there could be no doubt that they had come to a satisfactory conclusion. Looking back at the whole series of alarmns and excursions I offer the following personal views:
(1) The most disturbing shocks were the unpredicted and unexplained cases in the vicinity of smallpox hospitals.
(2) Consolation came from the application of the basic principles mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Edgar (1962) , in his report on the Bradford episode, writes: '. . . the experience underlines the unbelievable efficacy of the well established and time-honoured principles of careful investigation, successful tracing, vaccination and surveillance of contacts. Their efficacy when correctly applied is little short of miraculous.' (3) Unbridled emotion, secular and professional, added to the burden of the responsible departments where confidence in these principles may have been shaken by public alarm and demand. (4) Now is the time to initiate scientific investigations into the outstanding problems I have mentioned.
